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In Rem jurisdiction - Due Process•
Minimum Contacts • State Statutes
Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
THE DECISION OF Shaffer v. Heitner marks a significant departure from
established principles concerning in rem jurisdiction. No longer may
a court take jurisdiction of a lawsuit merely by sequestering any property of
the defendant that happens to be located in that state.
Appellee Heitner is a nonresident of Delaware and an owner of one share
of stock in Greyhound Corporation, a company incorporated under the
laws of Delaware but with its principal place of business in Phoenix, Arizona.
Heitner filed a stockholder's derivative action in a chancery court of Delaware
against the Greyhound Corporation, its subsidiary, Greyhound Lines, Inc., and
twenty-eight present or former officers and directors of the corporation. He al-
leged that the independent defendants violated their duty to stockholders by
engaging in actions which caused the corporation to be liable for a sub-
stantial amount in a private antitrust suit' and to be subjected to a large fine
for criminal contempt.' Jurisdiction over the defendants was predicated
on the court's order, upon Heitner's motion, for the sequestration of the
Delaware property of the individual defendants pursuant to DEL. CODE
tit. 10, § 366 (1974).' Simultaneously, a supporting affidavit was filed
stating that individual defendants were nonresidents and that the property
consisted of stock, options, warrants, and various corporate rights. The
stock of nineteen defendants and the options of two others were seized by
means of "stop transfer" orders on the books of Greyhound. Although the
I A judgment of $13,146,090 plus attorneys fees was entered against Greyhound in Mt. Hood
Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., No. 68-874, (D. Ore., filed Nov. 29, 1973), aff'd 555
F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977).
2 See United States v. Greyhound Corp., 363 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ill.), 370 F. Supp. 881
(N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd 508 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1974). Greyhound was fined $100,000 and
Greyhound Lines $500,000.
3 DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1974) provides in relevant part that if it appears that "any one
or more of the defendants is a nonresident of the State, the Court may make an order
directing such nonresident defendant or defendants to appear.... Such an order shall be served
on such nonresident defendant or defendants by mail or otherwise, if practicable, and shall
be published in such manner as the Court directs, not less than once a week for 3 con-
secutive weeks. The Court may compel the appearance of the defendant by the seizure of
all or any part of his property which property may be sold under the order of the Court to
pay the demand of the plaintiff, if the defendant does not appear or otherwise defaults.
Any defendant whose property shall have been so seized and who shall have entered a
general appearance in the cause may, upon notice to the plaintiff, petition the Court for
an order releasing such property or any part thereof from the seizure."
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stock and options were not physically located in Delaware, their presence for
the purposes of a sequestration order was noted by virtue of DEL. CODE
tit. 8, § 169 (1974), which provides that Delaware is the situs of ownership
of all stock in Delaware corporations. All defendants were notified of the
action by certified mail to their last known address and by publication in
the county paper where the action was brought.
The defendants whose property was seized entered a special appearance
and moved to quash service and vacate the sequestration order. They con-
tended that the ex parte seizure of their property did not afford them due
process of law and that they had insufficient contacts with Delaware to
sustain that state's exercise of jurisdiction. The chancery court denied the
motion and found that the limited purpose of the Delaware sequestration
statute - to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant4 - put it within the exception
to the constitutional due process prohibition of pre-hearing attachment
enunciated in Fuentes v. Shevin.5 The court also found that the Delaware
situs of the stock was a sufficient basis upon which quasi in rem jurisdiction
could be exercised. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed,6 lending only
cursory attention to appellants' contention that jurisdiction was not present
due to the absence of minimum contacts with the state of Delaware.'
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court noted probable juris-
diction.' Writing for the Court,9 Justice Marshall reversed, holding that
the fourteenth amendment's Due Process Clause prohibits the exercise of
adjudicatory authority by the states over nonresident defendants in the
absence of minimum contacts between the state, the defendant, and the
litigation in order that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." 10 Thus the Delaware statute
4 That is, to hold in-state property only until the defendant makes a general appearance
and then routinely release the property to him unless the plaintiff satisfies the Court that
the retention of the property is necessary to insure the satisfaction of any judgment obtained.
DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366.
-,407 U.S. 67, 91 n.23. (1969).
6 Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976).
T Id. at 229.
8 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2576. The Court considered the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court
to be an appealable final judgment within 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2) inasmuch as the con-
tested Delaware statute required the defendant either to enter a general appearance or suffer
default. 97 S. Ct. at 2576 n.12 (1977).
9 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, and Blackmun joined in Justice Marshall's
opinion. Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concur-
ring in the judgment. Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
10 97 S. Ct. at 2584. The Court chose not to examine the constitutionality of the pre-hearing
attachment exercised by the Chancery Court of Delaware. The constitutionality of pre-
hearing attachment and garnishment statutes has been increasingly called into question. See
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. DiChem., Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (garnishment of
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providing for seizure of property as a means of obtaining jurisdiction is
unconstitutional inasmuch as it allows for the exercise of adjudicatory
authority when minimum contacts between the nonresident defendant and
the state are absent.11
Although the summons procedure used would have been adequate to
bring the defendants within the court's jurisdiction had minimum contacts
existed,1" the Court found an absence of minimum contacts within the
circumstances presented by this case." The thrust of the appellee's argument
was that the state had a very strong interest in providing a forum for suits
by its citizens against directors and officers of a corporation created by
Delaware law. The Court, in rejecting this contention, relied heavily on
the fact that Delaware's jurisdictional statutes did not specifically refer
to such an interest.1" If the interest were so strong, the Court reasoned,
the Delaware law would certainly have recognized it. The emphasis which
the Court placed on the absence of this interest within the state statute
suggests that they might have reached a different decision had the juris-
dictional statutes contained it. Thus, although the strength of the state
interest was found not to be the determinative factor on which to base
a finding of minimum contacts, the Court left open the possibility that it may
allow this type of jurisdiction where a state enacts a proper statute. The main
obstacle that such a statute would have to overcome is the Court's reluctance
to base a minimum contacts analysis on a choice of law criterion.
Necessary in addition to the strong state interest in having the litigation
subject to its laws are acts by the defendants voluntarily associating them-
corporation's bank account); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (sequestra-
tion of debtor's property on which seller held vendor's lien); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972) (replevin); Sniadich v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (pre-
judgment garnishment of wages). Attachment or garnishment for the purpose of obtaining
jurisdiction has remained free from constitutional bar by being considered an "extraordinary
situation" within the meaning of Sniadich, 395 U.S. at 339; Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90. See
Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdiction: Outmoded and Unconstitutional?, 49 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 668
(1975).
1197 S. Ct. at 2585.
12 Id. at 2585 n.40. The validity of this assumption was sharply criticized by Justice Brennan
in his separate opinion. Id. at 2588-89. The Delaware Supreme Court found the sequestra-
tion statute to be solely for the purpose of obtaining quasi in rem jurisdiction. Greyhound
Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d at 229. To decide further that a "minimum contacts law that
Delaware expressly denies having enacted also could not be constitutionally applied in this
case" is for Justice Brennan a "pur[e] example of an advisory opinion." 97 S. Ct. at 2588.
Its inappropriateness, in Justice Brennan's view, was highlighted by the failure of counsel
for both sides to create an adequate factual record since they did not concern themselves
with the question of whether minimum contacts were present. Id. at 2589. Furthermore,
he argued, the Court should exercise constraint where it is making a constitutional pro-
nouncement since its decision will reach all fifty states. Id.
13 97 S. Ct. at 2585-87.
14 Id. at 2585-96.
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selves with Delaware and "purposely avail[ing themselves] of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum state," as the Court had required
in Hanson v. Denckla."5 Again, however, the Court noted that Delaware,
unlike some states,'" had failed to enact a statute whereby the act of accepting
a directorship of a domestic corporation constitutes consent to the state's
jurisdiction, so that directors of domestic corporations could be aware of the
possibility of being sued in the state of incorporation. In so doing, the Court
suggested that a consent type of statute, given the strong state interest,
might satisfy the minimum contacts standard. In its absence, however, the
defendants' contact with Delaware and Delaware's interest in maintaining
the litigation were held insufficient to meet the standard required by the
Due Process Clause."
The cornerstone of state court adjudicatory authority during the past
one hundred years has been Pennoyer v. Neff.'3 As the Shaffer Court noted,
Pennoyer set out the conceptual framework which has guided American
courts in their determination of jurisdictional questions.'" The two great
jurisdictional principles of Pennoyer were that "every State possesses ex-
clusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its
territory," and that "no state can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority
over persons without its territory.' 0 Thus, state power could be exercised
over those persons who could be personally served within its borders and
over such property as was present within the state. Actions against the person
15357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
'6 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-322, upheld in Weil v. Beresth, 26 Conn. Supp. 428,
225 A.2d 826 (Super. Ct. 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-33; S.C. CODE § 33-5-70, upheld in
Wagenberg v. Charleston Wood Products, 122 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. S.C. 1954).
17 Justice Brennan's dissent, primarily relying upon the strong state interest he perceived,
found minimum contacts to be present. 97 S. Ct. at 2589-93. The strong state interest
consists of providing a forum for stockholder derivative suits against officers and directors
of Delaware corporations, since they inure primarily to the benefit of the corporation,
many of whose stockholders will be residents of Delaware. Although choice of law inquiries
and jurisdictional ones are not the same, Brennan argues that they are of valid import
since they both depend upon the expectancies of the parties and the fairness of binding the
defendants by the law of a given jurisdiction. See, e.g., Traynor, Is This Conflict Really
Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REv. 657, 664 (1959). In addition, the defendants did avail them-
selves of the benefits of Delaware law by entering a relationship with a Delaware corpora-
tion. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253. In so doing they undertook responsibilities and
assumed powers solely derivative from state law. Therefore, according to the minimum
contacts standard, Delaware is a suitable forum. 97 S. Ct. at 2593.
18 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Neff brought an ejectment action in federal court against Pennoyer.
Pennoyer held the land under a claim of right based upon a sheriff's sale of Neff's land
to satisfy a judgment. The judgment was a result of a suit initiated by one Mitchell, then a
resident of Oregon, against Neff, a resident of Pennsylvania, for lawyer fees owing Mitchell.
Jurisdiction over Neff was predicated on an Oregon statute allowing for service by publica-
tion on nonresidents. The circuit court refused to recognize the Oregon judgment and
awarded the land to Neff. The Supreme Court affirmed.
19 97 S. Ct. at 2576.
20 95 U.S. at 722.
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were characterized as in personam and required personal service; actions
"against property" were characterized as in rem 1 and required no personal
service or notice to the owner but only the pre-hearing seizure of the local
property.
The continuing validity of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction is
predicated on the maintenance of two central concepts of Pennoyer: that
state territorial sovereignty is the constitutional basis of claims of adjudicatory
authority," and that an action against property in the state is not a direct
action against the person of the out-of-state owner.23 Both these premises
of in rem jurisdiction have been called into question by historical develop-
ments since Pennoyer.
The revolution which has occurred in the area of in personam juris-
diction"' has undermined the foundation upon which Pennoyer and, hence,
in rem jurisdiction,'2 stand. The limitations placed on the state exercise of
personal jurisdiction by Pennoyer were rigid and severe. From the beginning,
Pennoyer's rigidity made necessary the resort to legal fictions to bring within
its structure many classes of cases in which the state had a strong interest
in acquiring jurisdiction. Pennoyer itself recognized two exceptions to its
hard and fast rule of personal jurisdiction. It allowed for jurisdiction over
divorce actions where the plaintiff was domiciled in the state even though
the defendant could not be served with process within the state," and for
21 As used here, in rem refers to those classes of cases in which jurisdiction is founded
on the presence of property within the state. As such, it encompasses three types of "in
rem" actions: a strict action in rem which affects the interests of all persons in the property;
an action quasi in rem in which the plaintiff is seeking to establish a claim to certain
property and extinguish the interests of other persons; and an action quasi in rem in which
the plaintiff seeks to apply the property of a defendant to satisfy a claim against him.
357 U.S. at 246 n.12. The instant case is based on quasi in rem jurisdiction of the latter
type.
22 97 S. Ct. at 2580.
231d. at 2580-81.
24 For a history of the developments in the area of in personam jurisdiction, see, e.g.,
Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAv. L. REv. 909, 919-48 (1960);
Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241; Kurland,
The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State
Courts-From "Pennoyer" to "Denckla"; A Review, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 569 (1958).
25See, e.g., U.S. Industries v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
2972 (1977) (sequestration of nonresident defendants' stock in local corporation); Jonnet v.
Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1130-43 (3rd Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring)(attachment of local debtor's obligations to foreign corporation); Bekins v. Huish, 1 Ariz.
App. 288, 401 P.2d 743 (1965) (suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale
of in-state real estate owned by a nonresident); Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d
338, 316 P.2d 960 (1955), appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub nom., Columbia Broad-
casting Sys. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958) (suit by employees attacking collective bar-
gaining agreement entered into in the state where funds were being diverted to nonresident
trustee); Camire v. Scieszka, 358 A.2d 397 (N.H. 1976) (attachment of nonresident defen-
dant's liability insurance policy for auto accident which occurred in another state).
26 95 U.S. at 733-35.
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jurisdiction over corporations doing business in the state by using the concept
of implied consent.27 The invention of the automobile and the injuries which
sprang from its widespread use made necessary the extension of jurisdiction
to include out-of-state motorists. Thus the Court allowed states to imply
the motorist's consent to the appointment of an agent in the state for the
service of process.2" The amenability of out-of-state corporations to, local
suit was extended by considering their doing of business within the state
as a presence in the state upon which the courts could found jurisdiction."
The difficulty of applying quantitative tests of doing business in the state
led one court to the conclusion that it was less state sovereignty which was
serving as the basis of jurisdictional determinations than it was a question
of fairness to the defendant.2
The breakthrough in the area of personal jurisdiction came in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington." In International Shoe the Court discarded
the rationale of Pennoyer and established a new standard with which to
guide the states' exercise of adjudicatory authority. Since International Shoe,
the exercise of in personam jurisdiction has depended upon the presence of
minimum contacts" between the defendant, the litigation, and the state in such
271d. at 735-36.
28 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
29 Philadelphia & Reading R.R. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
30 Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.).
31 326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe Co. had salesmen in Washington who were
authorized to exhibit samples and take orders but not to enter into contracts. They had
no permanent offices but often rented space for exhibits. Washington tried to exercise
jurisdiction over International Shoe to enforce payments to the state's unemployment fund.
The Court upheld Washington's exercise of jurisdiction, but on a new theory.
32 The definition of the minimum contacts standard has received much attention from the
Court since International Shoe. International Shoe suggested that the minimum contacts
sufficient to allow personal jurisdiction are to be measured in terms of the quantity of
contacts in light of the fair and orderly administration of the laws. 326 U.S. at 319.
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. allowed the Ohio courts to exercise jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation even though the cause of action arose in another forum,
emphasizing general fairness as a key factor in subjecting foreign corporations to local
suit. 342 U.S. 437, 440 (1952). In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., a Texas
insurance company was found amenable to a suit concerning a life insurance policy in
California despite the fact that the only contacts were the issuance of the insurance policy
to a citizen of California and the insured's mailing of the premium from the state. 355
U.S. 220 (1957). Even in the absence of a great number of contacts, the Court upheld
California's exercise of jurisdiction due to the strong state interest in regulating insurance,
and the fact that the witnesses, the deceased and the plaintiff were all in California. In
addition, the defendant initiated the contact with the state of California and the cause of
action arose from the contacts therein. One year later, in Hanson v. Denckla, minimum
contacts were found to be absent where a Florida court was attempting to assert personal
jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee administering a trust created by the Florida testatrix
while domiciled in Pennsylvania, despite the fact that a considerable amount of correspon-
dence concerning the trust flowed between Delaware and Florida. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
The distinction with McGee seemed to have been in the fact that the Delaware trustee,
unlike the Texas insurance company, had not initiated any contacts with the forum state.
See note 24 supra.
[Vol.1I1:2
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a way that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."3 The Court thus rejected the Pennoyer concept
that the constitutional exercise of in personam jurisdiction is based upon
mutually exclusive state sovereignty."4 The immediate effect of this rule
was to expand the ability of the states to maintain personal jurisdiction
against those outside the state. 5
International Shoe, in espousing a minimum contacts standard, refuted
the underlying rationale of Pennoyer that it is state territorial power which
provides the constitutional framework of adjudicatory authority." Since
it is from this notion - that the state has power to effect the legal relations
of people and property within its borders - that in rem jurisdiction has
developed, the rejection of the Pennoyer concept in International Shoe served
to call into question the continued hardiness of in rem jurisdiction itself.3"
As the Shafler Court pointed out, a distinction between actions in personam
and actions in rem which rest solely upon state power over property within
its borders is rendered unstable by the International Shoe decision. The
Court reasoned that if actions in personam are to be judged by the minimum
contacts standard of International Shoe but actions in rem are not, there
must be a significant and clear difference between them to justify the
distinction. The maintenance of two different standards for essentially similar
classes of cases does not mesh with logic nor with the Due Process Clause.'
This distinction between actions against persons and actions in rem
stemmed from the proposition of Pennoyer that an action against property
does not constitute a direct action against the personal rights of the out-of-
state owner. Thus, an action in rem did not amount to an exercise of "direct
jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory. '9
It is the failure of this distinction to withstand the new developments in
jurisdictional concepts that caused the Supreme Court to find that all assertions
of jurisdiction must be founded on the same standard."0
It is clear that an action disposing of an owner's property will prejudice
3 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316, quoting from Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
3497 S. Ct. at 2580.
Id. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 24, at 1000-1008.
3s 326 U.S. at 316.
s7 See note 25 supra.
8 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950) (requiring
best notice possible to beneficiaries of a common trust upon judicial settlement of ac-
counts by trustee).
89 95 U.S. at 722.
40 97 S. Ct. at 2582.
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his personal property rights. 1 Pennoyer recognized this,!" but insisted that
since the property was within its borders and the judgment was limited to
the property before the court,"3 the action was not directly against the
person of the owner." This proposition has been strongly and uniformly
attacked by critical commentators 5 and has been undercut by the Court's
requirement that actual notice be given to an out-of-state owner whose
property rights are being adjudicated. " This notice requirement was grafted
onto in rem jurisdiction in recognition that an owner's personal property rights
are so substantially and directly impaired by an adverse ruling that his right
to due process is violated in the absence of such notice. It developed as a
somewhat incongruous notion that in rem jurisdiction affected the personal
rights of an owner to a sufficient degree to require that actual notice be
given, while at the same time an action against the property of a person
was not considered a direct action against the personal property rights of
the owner for jurisdictional purposes. Shaffer puts an end to this incongruity.
Shaffer v. Heitner marks the last step in the abandonment of the con-
ceptual structure of state jurisdiction set out by Justice Field in Pennoyer v.
Neff. It also puts an end to the much criticized practice of obtaining juris-
diction over a nonresident defendant by the pre-hearing "seizure" of a
res within the state unrelated to the underlying basis of the claim. Shaffer
has served to establish firmly the principles enunciated in International Shoe
as the foundation for the constitutional exercise of state adjudicatory au-
thority. As such, it has profound practical effects on the everyday assertion
of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in actions previously characterized
as in rem.
In those instances where strict in rem jurisdiction could previously be
invoked, Shaffer v. Heitner will have little effect since, as the Court noted,
there will normally be contacts between the state, the defendant, and the
litigation sufficient to bring jurisdiction within the minimum contacts standard
,1 Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76, 55 N.E. 812, 814, appeal
dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900) (Holmes, C.J.) (registration of land titles under a Torrens
system).
42 95 U.S. at 722.
43 The Supreme Court specifically rejected the notion that the limitation placed upon the
judgment by the property before the Court could act as a justification for the exercise of
jurisdiction. 97 U.S. at 2582, n.23. Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 88-90.
"95 U.S. at 722.
45 See, e.g., Developments, supra note 24; Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule o1 Personal
Jurisdiction: The Power Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L. J. 289 (1956); Hazard,
supra note 24; Traynor, supra note 17; Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudi-
cate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121 (1966).
46 Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchinson,
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of International Shoe." It is clear that the state has a very strong interest
in settling disputes concerning the marketability of property within its
territorial boundaries. This interest often rises to a necessity where real
property is involved."5 The situs of the property will also more than likely
be the most convenient forum. Additionally, the defendant will often have
sufficient contacts with the state by claiming an interest in property and
accepting the benefits of the protection of it by state law.'9 In short, his
contacts with the state would usually be sufficient under the International
Shoe standard of minimum contacts.
An action previously characterized as quasi in rem where the plaintiff
seeks to establish an interest in property within the state and extinguish
the right of another would likewise normally fall within the purview of
a minimum contacts analysis.5" The contacts between the state, the defendant,
and the litigation are similar to a strict in rem action except that it is no
longer necessary that the state be able to adjudicate the status of real
property in the state, regardless of the potential absence of a party, since
the rights of only the person before the court are at issue.5
The effect of ShafFer on actions quasi in rem where the property in
the state is unrelated to the underlying claim being asserted is immediate
and pervasive. 2 Henceforth, the existence of the res within the state is not
alone sufficient to justify the maintenance of jurisdiction. Thus, while there
may be other circumstances present which bring this type of action within
the minimum contacts standard,5" the presence of the res in the state is
no longer alone sufficient.
The effect of this ruling on state courts' exercise of jurisdiction will
47 97 S. Ct. at 2582.
48 See, e.g., Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, note 41 supra; Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. at 722.
49 Cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253. See, Developments, supra note 24, at 956.
50 97 S. Ct. at 2582.
51 Developments, supra note 24, at 957 n.302.
52 97 S. Ct. at 2582-83.
53 See note 32 supra. Since Shafler, a New York district court has upheld the constitutionality
of jurisdiction acquired by a New York resident's attachment of the contractural obligation
of an insurance company doing business in New York to defend and indemnify a Virginia
resident for his negligent actions. The court found that the type of jurisdiction being exer-
cised is a relevant consideration in determining whether the exercise of that jurisdiction
meets the due process requirements of fundamental fairness. Since here the stake in the
controversy was the plaintiff's claim for the payment of alleged damages by the New York
insurer, the nonresident was recognized by the court as only a nominal defendant, the real
defendant being his New York insurer who undertook the investigation, defense and settle-
ment of the claim. Because this type of jurisdiction runs solely in favor of New York
residents and is available only against insurers suable in the state, the court found that the
strictures of the fundamental fairness requirement were met. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving
Corp., 46 U.S.L.W. 2184 (E.D. N.Y. 1977).
Fall, 1977]
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depend upon how each state interprets its jurisdictional statutes in light of
ShafFer. If the sole purpose of a state statute is to allow the courts to exercise
quasi in rem jurisdiction where the underlying claim is unrelated to the
property, that statute will be found unconstitutional and void. Such a
statute is too broad to allow the courts to infer reasonably the power to
assert personal jurisdiction over a specific type of defendant in a certain
action according to the minimum contacts standard. Since courts derive
their jurisdiction from constitutional and statutory grant, the finding that
a particular jurisdictional statute is unconstitutional and void will prevent the
exercise of jurisdiction over all those defendants toward which the statute
is directed, regardless, of whether or not they may have minimum contacts
with the forum. The Due Process Clause merely serves to limit the extent
of the power which may be exercised. States are under no compulsion to
exercise jurisdiction to the limits of the Due Process Clause.5'
More than likely, however, state courts will interpret their statutes
to comply with a minimum contacts analysis so as to give effect to the
legislative intent to allow personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.
The courts will generally construe a statute so as to bring it within the
constitution.55 The courts may demonstrate a willingness to find implied
jurisdiction where the statute in question was addressed to a specific class
of defendants and a particular type of action in which minimum contacts
will normally be present.5" The determination will depend upon the clarity
with which the statute manifested an intention by the legislature to grant
the courts jurisdiction over more specific instances than merely those in which
a res exists within the state.57
Whether Ohio's service of process statute will survive constitutional
scrutiny after Shafler is unclear. The statute provides for constructive
service on nonresident defendants in a number of situations which are not
specifically conditioned upon the presence of minimum contacts.58
54 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. at 440. See, e.g., Traynor, supra note
17, at 659.
55 See, e.g., Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 (1944); United States v. Caro-
lene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1937).
56 Traynor, supra note 17, at 659.
57 This was exactly one of the disagreements Justice Brennan had in his dissent. The Court
was willing to infer an intention by the Delaware legislature to grant the courts jurisdiction
over actions such as the one herein; Justice Brennan was not. 97 S. Ct. at 2588-89 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). See note 12 supra.
5s Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2703.14 (Page 1954) states:
Service may be made by publication in any of the following cases;
(A) In an action for the recovery of real property or of an estate or interest therein,
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(B) In an action for the partition of real property, when the defendant is not a resi-
dent of this state or his place of residence cannot be ascertained;
(C) In an action to foreclose a mortgage or to enforce a lien or other encumbrance
or charge on real property, when the defendant is not a resident of this state or his
place of residence cannot be ascertained;
(D) In an action to compel the specific performance of a contract for the sale of
real property, when the defendant is not a resident of this state or his place of resi-
dence cannot be ascertained;
(E) In an action to establish or set aside a will, when the defendant is not a
resident of this state or his place of residence cannot be ascertained;
(F) In an action by an executor, administrator, guardian, or trustee seeking the
direction of the court respecting the trust or property to be administered and the
rights of the parties in interest, when the defendant is not a resident of this state or
his place of residence cannot be ascertained;
(G) In an action in which it is sought by a provisional remedy to take or to
appropriate in any way property of the defendant, when the defendant is not a resident
of this state or is a foreign corporation or his place of residence cannot be ascertained;
(H) In an action against a corporation organized under the laws of this state,
which has failed to elect officers or to appoint an agent upon whom service of summons
can be made, and which has no place of doing business in this state;
(I) In an action which relates to or the subject of which is real or personal
property in this state, when the defendant has or claims a lien thereon, or an actual or
contingent interest therein, or the relief demanded consists wholly or partly in exclud-
ing him from any interest therein, and such defendant is not a resident of this state
or is a foreign corporation or his place of residence cannot be ascertained;
(J) In an action against an executor, administrator, or guardian who has given
bond as such in this state, but at the time of the commencement of the action is not
a resident of this state or his place of residence cannot be ascertained;
(K) In an action or proceeding for a new trial or other relief after judgment, or
to impeach a judgment or order for fraud, or to obtain an order of satisfaction thereof,
when the defendant is not a resident of this state or his place of residence cannot be
ascertained;
(L) In an action where the defendant, being a resident of this state, has departed
from the country of his residence with intent to delay or defraud his creditors or to
avoid the service of a summons, or keeps himself concealed with like intent.
One extreme possibility as a result of Shaffer is that Ohio's service of process statute
will be invalidated since on its face it allows the courts to exercise adjudicatory authority
over nonresidents even though minimum contacts may be absent. This would create ajurisdictional vacuum in which Ohio's long-arm statute, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382
(Page Supp. 1976); Omio Civ. R. 4.3 (A), which is constructed within the minimum con-
tacts standard, would serve as the sole statutory basis for Ohio state courts to exercise
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.
Such an interpretation is, however, highly unlikely due to the presumption of con-
stitutionality that inheres in legislative enactments and the strong state interest involved.
Much more likely is that the court will graft the minimum contacts onto the service of
process statute on the basis of perceived legislative intent to obtain jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants. The willingness of the court to imply within the service of process
statute the minimum contacts test, may turn on the extent to which the grants contained
therein apply to circumstances where minimum contacts are likely to be present. Under
this analysis, § 2703.14 (A), which allows service of process on nonresident defendants
"[i]n an action for the recovery of real property or of an estate or interest therein" would
be upheld since it contains two of the core features of a minimum contacts analysis: the
contacts created by an interest in real property in the state,- see text accompanying notes
47-49 supra, and a relationship between the cause of action and the real property. While
these two aspects are not the only minimum contacts considerations, they do provide a solid
basis for the court to proceed to find a legislative intent to allow jurisdiction where
minimum contacts are present.
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One virtue of Pennoyer that will now be missing is the simplicity and
certainty of the test it offered for in rem jurisdiction. While previously
jurisdiction was established merely upon the determination that property
was within the state, now the court must look to a number of criteria, 9
all of which are capable of multiple interpretations."0 The history of in
personam jurisdiction since International Shoe serves as a testimony to the
difficulty in applying the minimum contacts standard."1 If, as the Supreme
Court argues, there remains a substantial core of situations in which there will
be no question as to the presence of jurisdiction, 2 the periphery that will
be subject to much litigation is nevertheless in itself substantial.
In an action characterized as strictly in rem, there usually will be
little question as to the presence of minimum contacts.63 It is conceivable,
however, that difficulties could sometimes arise where personal and not
real property is concerned. For example, the fact that most of the claimants
to the property are nonresidents, and that the contract governing the own-
ership of the property was executed in another state, may be sufficient to
cause the court to deny jurisdiction."4 The same types of problems will
also arise in that segment of quasi in rem jurisdiction where the action is
related to the property. Furthermore, the strength of the state's interest in
maintaining jurisdiction where real property is involved is somewhat weaker
since the rights of all persons in a res need not be adjudicated. Therefore,
considerations such as which state's law is applicable, where the evidence is
primarily located, and how great the nonresident defendant's contacts are,
will assume greater significance and make the determination more difficult.
That segment of quasi in rem jurisdiction in which the property is unrelated
to the cause of action will be subject to all the uncertainties of the minimum
In contrast is § 2703.14 (G) which allows service of process on nonresident defendants
"[iun an action in which it is sought by a provisional remedy to take or appropriate in
any way property of the defendant," the provisional remedy being, in most instances,
attachment, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.01 (Page Supp. 1976), or garnishment, Oto
REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.11 (Page Supp. 1976). Since the statute allows attachment re-
gardless of the relationship between the property attached, the claim giving rise to the
action, and any contacts with Ohio, the Shaffer Court's declaration that in-state property is
alone insufficient to establish jurisdiction may compel the Ohio courts to hold such a
provision invalid.
59 See note 32 supra.
60 In this respect, the Court, as Justices Powell and Stevens suggest, may have decided more
than is necessary. Id. at 2587-88. Powell and Stevens have argued that some structures
of in rem jurisdiction could be retained without a sacrifice of "fair play and substantial
justice," and thereby a measure of simplicity and certainty could be gained.
61 97 S. Ct. at 2584. See note 32 supra.
62 See Developments, supra note 24, at 956.
63 See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
64 See Developments, supra note 24, at 956.
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contacts test.65 The existence of the property within the state will be of
little assistance to the court in finding whether minimum contacts are
present. The consequence for all three types of in rem actions 6 is that what
was once simple and certain has become complicated and tenuous.
Nevertheless, despite the uncertainties and confusion Shaffer portends,
it is a decision which is long overdue. The concept of in rem jurisdiction
has proved over time to be an inadequate means to insure the fairness
which the Due Process Clause seeks to protect. Shaffer v. Heitner corrects
this defect.
RICHARD S. MILLIGAN
65 See text accompanying notes 52-57 supra.
, See note 21 supra.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
State Funding of Nontherapeutic Abortions • Medicaid Plans.
Equal Protection • Right to Choose an Abortion
Beal v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977).
Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977).
Poelker v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2391 (1977).
n Beal v. Doe' the United States Supreme Court held that Title XIX
of the Social Security Act' permits but does not require states participating
in the Medicaid program established by that Act to fund nontherapeutic
abortions. In the companion cases of Maher v. Roe3 and Poelker v. Doe,"
the same majority5 held in Maher that the Equal Protection Clause does not
require a state that funds childbirth and therapeutic abortions to also fund
the costs of nontherapeutic abortions, and in Poelker, that the Constitution
does not prohibit a state or city from forbidding the performance of elective
abortions in public hospitals while providing hospital services for child-
1 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977).
2 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1970).
3 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977).
'97 S. Ct. 2391 (1977).
5 Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in dissents in all three cases.
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